Abstract: The Great Recession in Germany was noticed only seven months after its onset. This study examines whether the available data could have helped to predict or identify the crisis in real time. After assessing the accuracy of previous recession forecasts, we examine that of forecasts published from April to December 2008 by twelve major national and international forecast institutions and confront them with real-time data from official statistics, major surveys, and indicators. While annual forecasts for 2008 were unusually accurate due to errors of semi-annual forecasts offsetting each other, forecasters failed to observe the onset of the recession in Q2 2008, although from May onward an increasing amount of data indicated that the economy was in recession or was likely about to enter one. Though the data were neither ambiguous nor misleading, forecasters recognised the onset of the recession as late as mid-November, but also failed to warn of a coming recession. The most convincing explanations for these failures to recognize the crisis in time appear to have been the 'truth effect' and forecasters' 'low priors about the likelihood of a recession'.
Introduction
The worldwide recession from 2007 to 2009 was the most severe post-World War II crisis on record. Real GDP growth in advanced countries plummeted from nearly 3 % in 2007 to stagnation in 2008 and, thereafter, to -3½ % in 2009 . By 2015, many countries had still not regained pre-crisis economic levels. For forecasters, the crisis was a debacle. In particular, the accuracy of forecasts for Germany was among the poorest in Europe -the onset of the recession was seen only in November, seven months after it had started in Q2 2008 -, surpassed only by the failures of Finland and Ireland, 1 although exact reasons for different forecast performances remain unclear.
Only few studies have examined why forecasts for Germany performed so poorly and none has asked why the 2008-09 recession was not recognized until seven months after it began. The Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, or Joint Diagnosis (JD), a group of then four major German forecasters, presented only a brief analysis of its forecast performance in 2008 and did not address why the start of the recession had not been detected earlier (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 1966 ff.) The Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, or the Council of Economic Experts (CEE), did not provide any analysis of its forecast performance. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a detailed analysis of the accuracy of its forecasts both during and after the financial crisis, 2 yet similar to a study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), this analysis remained rather unspecific in terms of its national forecast performance (Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund (henceforth: IEO) 2014; Pain et al. 2014) . Macroeconometric model studies that would detail why the forecasts were wrong are missing. 1 See e. g., Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, or Joint Diagnosis (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 2008a, Table 2 .3, Table 2 .1).
2 The OECD, based on correlation results, finds that forecasting errors are related to country specific factors such as openness, regulations, financial structure from 2007-2012 and finds 'trade openness' to be a major factor (Pain et al. 2014) . IMF examined the role of characteristics of forecast producers, including experience and occupational position, for errors in its 2007-2011 forecasts and sees 'experience' to be important in reducing errors (Genberg, Martinez 2014, pp. 31 ff.) . 3 For the United States, see e. g., Fair 2010 and Stock and Watson 2012;  for the Netherlands e. g., de Jong, Abbing and Verbruggen 2010. Several studies examined whether the crisis could have been foreseen. Testing the capabilities of leading indicators in forecasting GDP and industrial production, Drechsel/Scheufele (2011 , 2012 concluded that 'many leading indicators, in particular surveys, performed relatively well during the crisis period' (Drechsel/Scheufele 2012: 444) , but when compared with the forecasts below, their accuracy was disappointing. 4 Using the Ifo-Business climate Index (Ifo-BCI) and the so-called three-month rule, Nierhaus/Abberger (2014) dated the upper turning point of the economy to October 2007 and for industrial production to March 2008. Schreiber et al. (2012: 200 ff.) examined a broad range of methods in order to predict turning points with real-time data. They found that since July 2008 nearly all of them suggested that Germany was in recession. Using some of the data presented below, Boulier/ Kovacs/Stekler (2016) find with a CUSUM based diffusion index that the recession started in Q2 of 2008. 5 In what follows, we confront -similar to Fintzen/Stekler (1999) examining the forecasts of the recession that occurred in 1990 in the United States -, the development of forecasts in 2008 with that of real-time data and ask whether the data available to forecasters could have enabled them to see the start of the recession earlier than in November 2008. The question can be split into three parts: 1. Did forecasts published after April 2008 fully account for information available from official sources and from major surveys or indicators? 2. Were data available to forecasters after April 2008 ambiguous or erroneous -that is, were there meaningful revisions? 3. Did any factors in the process of forecasting contribute to forecasting errors?
The analysis is limited to the beginning of the recession, covering the period from April to December 2008; given the inside and outside lags of fiscal and monetary policy, this is the most crucial stage of a crisis. In Section 2 we briefly examine the accuracy of recession forecasts for Germany (henceforth: German recession forecasts) and in detail the development of forecasts by major institutions from April to December 2008. In Section 3, we describe the selection and evaluation of the data. Section 4 confronts the data with forecasts and their revisions. In Section 5, we summarise our findings and offer some conclusions and further thoughts.
Recession forecasts
This section examines the accuracy of real GDP -hereafter, simply GDPforecasts, in particular for 2008 and 2009 . However, for reasons of comparison, we start with a brief look at the accuracy of previous recession forecasts by four major forecasters: the JD, the CEE, the OECD, and the federal government (Jahreswirtschaftsbericht der Bundesregierung, or the Government Annual Economic Report (GAER)). 'Recessions' are technically defined as at least two consecutive quarters of declining GDP (adjusted for seasonal variations and calendar effects), measured by rates of change against the previous quarter (qtq). The definition is part of the business cycle concept, which differs from the growth cycle concept based on year-to-year (yty) rates of changes of GDP (Zarnowitz 1992: 195 f.) . However, for Germany dates and duration of recessions according to the two concepts rarely differed by more than one quarter. , 1967 -2002 From 1967 , the Federal Republic of Germany endured nine recessions, in 1967 , 1975 , 1981 -1982 , 1991 , 1993 , 2002 -2003 -2013 ( Figure 1 , Table 1 ). Excluded from this list are in what follows the recessions of 1991 and of 2012-2013. The recession of 1991 was a statistical artefact caused by the severe adjustment crisis in East Germany subsequent to German unification; the recession of 2012-2013 was the result of revisions of quarterly data in the course of the Federal Statistical Office (FSO)'s transition to the European System of Accounts (ESA) 2010 in 2014. Our assessment in this section is based on annual forecasts of rates of change of GNP/GDP. 6 Quarterly forecasts, which clearly would have been preferable, have been published only since 1980. In addition, they were rarely presented in numerical form and were frequently revised, and are therefore quite difficult to evaluate; the same difficulties hold for half-year forecasts though they have a much longer history. Actual GNP/GDP data are first vintage data as published in the JD's spring forecasts. Until the early 1990s, many forecasts (rates of change) were rounded to 0.5 %. To render forecasts comparable, all forecasts and actual data have been rounded; accuracy measures for the rounded and original forecasts hardly differ.
Recessions
Ignoring that both the magnitude and the timing of recessions depend greatly on which version of the data is used (McNees 1992) , the recessions usually did not last longer than two or three quarters; more broadly defined as 'Lower turning point'-phases (LTP), 7 they lasted approximately four quarters. Depth, course, and duration of the recessions varied considerably (Table 1, Figure 1 ).
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The 1966-1967 recession 9 -a stabilisation crisis triggered by monetary policy -with a decrease of GDP by 0.5 % in 1967 (Q2 1966-Q3 1967) was an , 1974-2008 , Q1 ( = 100) marks the cyclical peak, the X-axis the number of quarters after the peak.
7 Terms refer to a four-phase business cycle classification, including 'Upswing' (UP), 'Upper turning point' (UTP), 'Downswing' (DOWN), and 'Lower turning point' (LTP), based upon a multivariate linear discriminant analysis using quarterly yty rates of change of 10 (12) major macroeconomic variables and ratios. For details concerning the scheme, see Heilemann and Schuhr 2008. 8 Data refer to the FSO's February release for the previous year as shown in the spring forecasts of the JD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 1966 ff.). 9 Pre-1970 data are from the publication of quarterly national accounts data by German Institute for Economic Research; for the subsequent period, see . Quarterly national accounts data have been adjusted for working days and seasonal variations (Census X-11 ARIMA).
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Second oil-crisis and Fiscal consolidation crisis -
exceptionally mild recession compared to subsequent recessions -so much that it could even be labelled as stagnation, given later GDP revisions (Räth 2009 ).
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It was followed by two exogenous crises: the first oil crisis (Q2 1974-Q2 1975) , during which the GDP shrank by 3.5 % and the second oil crisis (Q2-Q4 1981), during which GDP contracted by 0.5 %. Next came two endogenous crises: a fiscal consolidation crisis (Q2-Q3 1982) , in which the GDP shrank by 1 %, making it a recession of medium scale and the even smaller unification crisis (Q2 1992-Q1 1993) triggered mostly by a large tax increase to finance German unification with 2 % GDP contraction in 1993. Finally, the high-tech industry crisis (Q4 2001-Q2 2002) , largely caused by the end of the high-tech boom in the United States, with GDP in 2002 and 2003 merely stagnating. None of these recessions had been foreseen by these forecasters in their autumn year-in-advance forecasts. In fact, none of these institutions' autumn forecasts ever predicted a recession whatsoever. Forecasts in spring for the current year overlooked recession in four (JD) and two (OECD) cases out of five, but mostly recognized them only after recessions had started. Mean absolute errors (MAE) in autumn forecasts for the coming year were more than twice as large for pre-crisis years, with spring forecast errors one third larger, while autumn forecasts, despite having considerably high errors, were more or less similar to those in non-crisis years. As usual, forecast errors vary with the depth 
Sources: Heilemann and Stekler (2013) 1974 , 1980 , 2001 crisis years: 1967 , 1975 , 1981 , 1982 , 1993 , 2002 In (…) : excluding 2009.
10 Recession was limited to the first half of the year, when GDP fell by 1.7 %, or 2.2 %, excluding agricultural production (Sachverständigenrat 1967, Item 74) .
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of the crisis; excluding the crisis of 1966-1967, the lowest errors for the year ahead were recorded for the second oil crisis and the highest for the first oil crisis. For current-year spring forecasts, the record is better, notably for the OECD. Surprisingly, the size of errors appears to be rather independent from whether the origin of the crisis was domestic or international or caused endogenously or exogenously, respectively.
The Great Recession, 2008-2009
The Great Recession appears to have been essentially foreign-born, at least when looking at the course of indicators (see Figure 4 below Döhrn et al. 2008: 134) . The Bundesbank would later write that in the spring and summer of 2008, due to the slowing of the world economy and rising inflationary tensions triggered by increasing prices for food and an oil-shock, the upswing had ended and entered normal cyclical moderation (Deutsche Bundesbank 2010: 20) .
In what follows, we examine GDP forecasts from twelve major institutions; eight of which are non-profit research institutions substantially subsidised by the government (CEE, DIW, Ifo, IfW, IWH, and RWI) and the unions (IMK); two are political institutions (Deutsche Bundesbank and the European Union Commission (EUC)), while the IMF and OECD are intergovernmental institutions (for sources of the forecasts see Appendix). Consensus Forecasts (CF) (Consensus Economics 2014) are not included in our present selection but monthly CF means and standard deviations are reported as memorandum items.
Regarding content and forecast methods, our selection is rather homogenous. All institutions present similarly detailed forecasts and all use the socalled GDP model approach, which is an informal combination of forecasts with the results of macroeconometric models, indicators, and surveys (OECD 2014; Döhrn 2014: 144 ff.; Zarnowitz 1992: 401 f.) . While all predictions are produced by groups, their hierarchical structures vary considerably.
Annual forecasts for 2008 and 2009 appear in Table 3 * (Appendix) and Figure 2 , and intra-annual forecasts are shown in Table 2 . Some forecasters added error margins to their predictions that are not shown here but are addressed in text.
Forecast errors for 2008 are comparatively low and concentrate on net exports, 11 which would back the view that the recession was foreign-born, though ignoring the interdependencies of the demand aggregates is risky. However, while the estimates for the first half of the year are rather accurate, the estimates completely missed the recession in the second (see Section 4).
Although comparisons of individual institutions are not of interest for our purposes, it is noteworthy that the IMF and OECD were sometimes more 11 Results of forecast accuracy by demand aggregates are available from the authors.
Sources: see Table 3 *. Quarterly data are qtq rates of change, half-year data are yty rates of change of unadjusted data. Annualized forecasts are calculated back to normal qtq rates of change.
a Original data.
Half-year data from July 2015.
sceptical than national forecasters. In OECD forecasts, this scepticism did not necessarily mean a better informational underpinning -for example, with respect to international development -given the institution's considerable publication lag compared to that of other forecasts (IEO 2014: 9 ff.). The first institution to see stagnation in 2009 was the IMF in October 2008, which predicted stagnation in 2009 and revised this to -0.8 % in November, as the OECD would similarly do later this month. The JD expected a minor increase (0.2 %), yet referred to the bandwidth of its 2009 GDP forecast of -0.9 % and 1.3 % and supplemented its forecast with a risk scenario pointing to a possible decline of 0.8 %.
12 In mid-November, the CEE predicted stagnation for 2009 and was the first on the national level to ask for fiscal stimuli (CEE 2008 (CEE /2009 . With MAEs of one (1.5 for recession years) in autumn forecasts for the following year, however, as Table 2 reveals, it had been risky to ignore at least the possibility of stagnation or recession in 2009 since July 2008.
The unusually high accuracy of the annual JD and OECD forecasts for 2008 also characterises the demand aggregates. While domestic use had been correctly foreseen, export forecasts were far too optimistic but were compensated by overly low forecasts of imports. However, the MAEs are now smaller than the average over the last ten years. For 2009, of course, things were different. As to be expected from the experience with spring forecasts for the following year and the development after the Lehman Brothers collapse, the spring forecasts were entirely off the mark, particularly for investments, exports, and imports.
Two results may be added. First, for the 2009 forecasts, three nationally and internationally operating banks published negative GDP forecasts from 13 October 2008, and from 10 November, nearly all banks and IHS Global Insights, a commercial forecasting service, did so as well, ranging from -0.1 % (Bank Julius Bär) to -2.0 % (BHF-Bank) (Consensus Economics (2008) ). Second, standard deviations of forecasts, increases of which may signal a turning point Döpke/Fritsche/Slacalek 2012), were rather low and stable for 2008; for 2009 forecasts they increased as late as October, yet remained at that level for the rest of the year (Table 3*).
12 The scenario was based on assumptions that world trade would expand by a rate of only 1 %, not the 3 % in the forecast, with a worsening of financial conditions for business and private households, an increase of the saving rate by 0.5 % points and a reduction of crude oil prices and other raw materials by 10 %, against assumptions in the forecast. The GDP in 2009 would decline by 0.8 % (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 2008b: 46f.).
Data selection and evaluation
The stock of possibly relevant information for short-term forecasting has few limits, particularly for countries with strong international linkages. For outsiders, it is difficult to assess the information and their relevance for various forecasters, even if high correlations between forecasts point to much common ground -notwithstanding the role of theory, idiosyncratic factors, judgement, or other forecasts (Osterloh 2008) . While a statistics-based identification of key data is possible with now-casting models (e. g., Giannone, Reichlin, Small 2005) , in the informal GDP model framework this is feasible at best for forecasters themselves.
The data considered included, first, direct measures of current economic activity and prices as reported in press releases by the FSO and Eurostat for the European Union and the euro area. 'Press releases' allow an exact dating of the news; they also ensure a high level of attention of the news disclosed, although data releases follow a rather fixed calendar. We also included macroeconomic measures or policies announced by the federal government and the European Central Bank's (ECB) short-term interest rate. Second, we involved indirect measures of current and future activity: the Ifo Business Climate Index (Ifo-BCI), the ZEW Financial Markets Expectations (ZEW-FME), the OECD's Composite Leading Indicator for Europe (OECD-CLI), and as a memorandum item, the Conference Board's Composite Leading Economic Index for the US economy (TCB-LEI).
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Whether all of these data are 'new' when released or contain information that forecasters find stale or redundant (Tetlock 2011 ) is difficult for third parties to decide. For many statistics regarding orders, production, sales, etc., or for surveys and CLIs, news agencies publish estimates and these figures, too, may or even have to be estimated by forecasters themselves.
14 In this case, of course, only the difference between estimates and actual data is new. However, since we lacked information on this point, we took the news at face value. The period examined begins on 1 April 2008, when most forecasters selected by us had started to release their spring forecasts, and ends on 31 December 2008 (with one exception), when the release of their fall forecasts was completed.
In all, the selection of 25 series of monthly and quarterly official data, CLI/LEI, and surveys was rather small considering the more than 800 variables possibly relevant to short-term forecasting and the more than 120 leading indicators available (Drechsel/Scheufele 2012) . One reason for our restriction was the slight relevance of many of these data, in part also due to overlapping or double counting; another was the limited capacity of studies such as ours. Again, we lack information on which data the twelve forecasters deemed relevant; in turn, we did not include data on the automotive sector, for example, whose deteriorating prospects as from late summer 2008 seemed to have been of major concern for policy makers.
The assessment of data was kept simple. We distinguished only positive ( ▲), negative ( ▼), and neutral (♦) signals, mostly as changes against the previous period. For the reasons explained before we refrained from evaluating the strength of signals. We also refrained from discriminating between lagging, coincident, and leading indicators. In general, the classification of news did not cause problems; an exception were price data. We categorized falling (rising) prices as negative (positive) signals. That decision may be a cause for debate, since this could also signify an imminent decrease of interest rates, as Fintzen/ Stekler (1999) had assumed for the United States. However, this only illustrates that categorizations like ours ignore that the signals sent by news may differ depending on category, cyclical stage, and policy makers' or forecasters' experience.
Results

Signals
Our selection of real-time data appears in chronological order in Overview 1*, the full set in Overview 2* (Electronic Appendix). In all, we recorded 176 entries for 131 days, on average 20 signals per month, 47 % of which were positive, 49 % were negative, and 4 % were neutral. Excluding price signals -about 30 % of all signals -, which mostly reflected the steep increase of food and oil prices in the first half of 2008 and their steep decline in the second half, 15 the relationship is 
Forecast revisions
Both annual and intra-annual forecasts for 2008 appear to show very little reaction to the signals from the national as well as from the international economy (OECD 2014) that worsened increasingly since May. Forecast averages increased from about 1.8 % in April to more than 2 % by July, after which they continuously fell to 1.5 % in December.
For quarterly and half-year forecasts, which are not published by all forecasters, the record is quite similar. Whereas most forecasts for Q2 turned negative, most forecasts for Q3 saw stagnation and became negative only in November, after official GDP data had been released, while Q4 predictions had been negative since September. The only exception was the EUC's forecast, which as early as September expected negative growth for Q3, but did not identify the decline in Q2 and Q3 as a recession, perhaps because it expected growth to rebound in Q4. From mid-September onward, all forecasters expected stagnation in Q4, and one predicted even negative growth for Q3. Given the presumably high margins of error regarding quarterly forecasts compared with annual ones -numerical information on this point seems to be missing -it is astonishing that no forecaster noticed the high probability or at least the possibility of the economy already being in recession.
More reactions to signals of a deteriorating economy appear in the forecasts for 2009. Until August, some forecasters expected GDP growth to decelerate to 1 %; however, in early September -that is, before the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September -some started to see stagnation. Nevertheless, not until mid-November did forecasters begin to expect a deepening of the recession, which they then realised the economy had been in since April 2008.
Looking more closely at data and forecast revisions reveals that after a strong Q1 until May, data about production, sales, and new orders, as well as the labour market, had suggested more or less a continuation of the upswing seen in autumn 2007. The prospects started to turn in early June, when negative signals for May came from production, wholesale turnover, and most forward-looking data -new domestic and foreign orders, industrial production, and investment activity -signalling a cooling down of the economy (Figures 4 and 5) . Similar messages came from data for Europe and from the Ifo-BCI -which had signalled a downswing since January 2007 -, the ZEW-FME, and the OECD's CLI, as well as from The Conference Board's US LEI. Rising prices diminished the expansion of real income, thereby halting private consumption that to some extent could have compensated for the shortfall of international demand. On 3 July, the ECB reacted to rising prices and raised interest rates by 0.25 % points. The immediate effects of the hike would be small in 2008, but darkened prospects for 2009. However, for some observers, the step may have implied that, despite financially turbulent times worldwide, the ECB's outlook on growth in the euro area and Germany remained The outlook seemed to have become rosier on 7-8 October, when for August increases in new orders for industry -slightly corrected later -, production and sales were reported. Though orders for major industries had considerably declined, the positive news appears to have caused at least one forecaster to cling to his forecast for 2008 from spring and to only see stagnation in Q3 preventing him from stating that the country was in recession. 
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However, to assess data for just one month as an indication that the downward trend had stopped was unusual and risky. In fact, during 1970-2007, 0 % qtq GDP rates of change outside recession periods had been recorded just five times and the margin between a stagnating and shrinking GDP in Q3 of then EUR 659 billion barely exceeded EUR 1 billion, not to mention the shakiness of data for this month.
In September, new orders and production resumed their downward course, albeit on a far steeper path. Negative signals now came from the price side as well. Less clear were the trends of exports and imports. Imports increased until July and then started to fall, thus indicating a further cooling off; exports followed a similar trend, though both improved in October and November; revised data display stagnation until October (exports) or a much smoother decline (imports).
A similar picture emerges with the FSO's Business Cycle Monitor ( Figure 5 ), a four-phase classification of trend and seasonally adjusted real-time data for new orders, production, and turnover published monthly (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008; Oltmanns 2009 ). From January 2008 onward, it displays a continuous, progressive downswing that improved only at the end of that year, with the exception of GDP and retail sales. Similarly, since Q2, Eurostat's Business Cycle Clock (Eurostat 2014) classified both the European Union and the euro area as being in recession. The 'Recession Word Index', an index based on two major German newspapers had signalled 'recession' already in Q1; however, it reached its peak only in Q4 2008 and in Q1 2009 (Iselin/Siliverstovs 2016). As usual, not all data consistently pointed in the same direction and, in retrospect, the data give a more clear-cut picture than at the time of their release. However, from Q2 onward, most aggregates of domestic use were on their way down, in particular net exports.
Later data revisions were small and did not alter the picture formed by the first vintage data, despite the exceptions of data regarding exports and imports. Preliminary results for August showed a considerable fall of both exports and imports, which later might have caused forecasts to be changed to 'stagnation'.
Since October, growth forecasts for 2008 had been reduced by about 0.3 % points whereas predictions for 2009 fell on average by 2.1 % points, -from approximately 0.3 % in September to about -1.8 % in December.
While averaging annual GDP forecasts for 2008 (similarly the development of CF forecasts) reveals a considerable increase from April to July from about 1.8 % to about 2.0 % and a return to about 1.8 % in early November and to 1.5 % in December, the direction and extent of revisions varied considerably. As to be expected, revisions for 2009 were much greater, particularly from September onward, but recognized the recession only in November.
Looking at the path of quarterly forecasts, a major cause of revisions seems to have been the release of official forecasts. In reaction to unexpectedly good results for Q1, forecasts from the first half-year rose by about 0.5 % points; forecasts for the second half were lowered by about 0.5 % points, until September. They became negative starting in November, partially due to official Q3 data, but most of all because of the then present predictions for a strong decline for Q4.
Unfortunately, a comparison of our results is only possible with that of studies that cover longer periods and broader sets of countries. Our findings appear to match the size of revisions found by Dovern et al. (2014) for the revision of annual CFs in advanced economies over the 1989-2011 period. However, they seem to contradict Isiklar/Lahiri/Louganis's (2006) findings, which are based on CFs for the G7 1989 to 2004, that it takes five months for German forecasters to include 90 % of new information and that foreign news find rather late attention. Looking at the revisions of quarterly forecasts, attention to news seems to have been quicker, which reminds us that forecast revision may be a rough indicator for measuring information updates and information rigidity. While forecasters are liable to update their information they may not change their predictions, or revise them without new information (Sheng/Wallen 2014) -in the end, 'new' is a subjective standard. This is, of course, notwithstanding that 'quick revision' does not necessarily mean more accurate forecasts, as Figure 2 and Table 2 Table 1 ).
Forecasters may point out that, at the time, Germany had no experience with a financial crisis that is a serious banking, sovereign debt, or currency crisis, and whose consequences for the real economy in 2008 are still not fully understood. Also, forecasters cannot be blamed for not having anticipated the 'common shock' of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, it is difficult to understand why they downplayed 'the transmission that occurs due to mechanisms that are really the result of cross-border contagion emanating from the epicentre of the crisis' (Reinhart/Rogoff 2009: 240) , that is the crisis in the United States that had started in 2007. While the JD in early October calculated a high probability that the euro area had been in recession since late 2007, the JD abstained from revealing what that implied for Germany or from presenting a similar estimate for the country (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 2008b: 26ff.) .
The answer to the second question, concerning whether data available to forecasters were ambiguous or erroneous -that is, whether there were meaningful revisions -is clearly negative. There were no meaningful revisions of GDP data, and the revision of the decline of GDP in Q2 from -0.2 % to -0.5 % (25 November 2008) only reinforced the picture of a downswing that turned out to be a recession.
The last question of whether any factors in the process of forecasting contributed to forecasting errors is more difficult to answer. The 'informal GDP model' employed provides many advantages for forecasters, yet complicates tracing the various factors that shape forecasts and where errors come from. It is an eclectic approach that varies between forecasters and third parties know little about it; ex post, even forecasters themselves will find it difficult to trace the forecast published. One factor in the process of forecasting the recession so slowly could have been, as said before, that the country had not experienced a financial crisis before, and the magnitude and speed of this recession's international propagation made it unpredictable. This reasoning would align with Dominguez/Fair/Shapiro's (1988) -disputed -finding that the Great Depression in the United States was unpredictable because a similar crisis had not happened before, as well as with the discussion in Koll et al. (2009) . However, the argument holds primarily for the time after the collapse of Lehman Brothers; at least, a recession had not been suggested before, despite considerable financial market turmoil since 2007. The argument also lacks detail, for example, whether forecasters had made faulty assumptions, 18 had missed changes of major reactions of consumers, investors, etc., or a combination of both. Interestingly, forecasts for 2009 made in the spring of that year were surprisingly accurate by historical standards, despite further expansion of the crisis on the one hand and combined national and international fiscal and monetary interventions of unprecedented magnitude on the other.
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Explanations that are more specific are offered in the next section.
Explanations
One reason why forecasters may have underreacted to signals is that theory, experience or judgement prevented them from seeing the start of the crisis in time. We have no solid evidence for this argument; however, it would be surprising if this would hold for all forecasters in the same way. Another explanation, then, could be that data were 'noisy' or their processing 'sticky'. Table 1 . 20 So-called 'sticky' processing of information -updating information only once in a while -is considered to stem from the cost of acquiring and processing information. By contrast, 'noisy' information models assume that forecasters update their information continuously yet observe the true state of the economy with error (Clements 2012) .
However, the first explanation does not find much support by the data: revisionsoften used to proxy the noise of noisy information models -were few and small. Whether the processing of the data was 'sticky' is difficult to decide. When seen from the forecasts: if there was stickiness, it appears to have been asymmetrical; indicators warning since 2007 (e. g., the Ifo-BCI, produced by an institution in the present sample) seem to have received only minor attention, whereas positive signals for August emerging in early October seem to have been taken up immediately.
Another line of argument would cite behavioural factors to explain why forecasts failed, some of which -e. g., the status quo bias, overconfidence effects, the actuality bias -are well known to affect, but not necessarily forecasts. The number of such factors is now rather large (Kahneman 2011) , though it is still unclear whether the results also hold when forecasts are produced by groups. In addition, biased evaluations of single pieces of information in large, complex systems as employed in short-term forecasting may level out. Forecasts may benefit from aggregation gains and thus may be right for wrong reasons, as was the case for the annual forecasts for 2008.
Of particular influence in 2008 appears to have been the truth effect, meaning 'a person's belief in an ambiguous statement increases as he or she encounters the statement more often' (Tetlock 2011: 2) . Despite Ifo's alarming business expectations, forecasters, the federal government, and large parts of the business community continued to see the economy as being in a healthy, competitive position to withstand turbulence from international financial markets and the international economy until October (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 October 2008). In the same article, federal government spokesperson Thomas Steg, too, declared that the German economy, despite its current weakening, could defend its position in international markets, ruling out stimulation programs. Federal Minister of Finance Peer Steinbrück could hope that in 2009 he would become the first federal minister of finance in more than 40 years to present a balanced budget and at this point was hardly enthusiastic about prospects of shrinking revenues or additional expenditures. Even at the end of 2008 when all 2009 forecasts expected a shrinking of the GDP by 2 % and stimulation packages were underway, these forecasts were widely criticised as being much too sceptical (Döhrn 2014: 152) . Post-World War II Germany had not experienced a financial crisis and politicians, large parts of the business community and forecasters seemed to have sufficient reason to believe that 'Germany is different'. A real economy crisis caused by contagion would 'happen to other people in other countries and other times' (Reinhart, Rogoff 2010: 9 ) -a variant of the 'This time is different syndrome' -, however, this belief was hardly supported by Germany's experience. Similarly, the EUC, which in September had stated that 'in some cases, advanced economies appear to be close to a technical recession', avoided to mention this possibility for Germany, but instead found economic fundamentals to be strong (EUC 2008: 11) . The ECB's optimism when raising interest rates in July, 21 a decision reversed only on 9 October, could be added as a reason, as could the distraction of forecasters caused by financial turbulence worldwide in the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, the turbulence had in fact Could the recession 2008-09 be foreseen?
Forecasters themselves make the case that predicting a recession could become a 'self-fulfilling prophecy'.
24 However, to be destabilising, a forecast must be believed and acted upon and generate the feared results. 25 Given the large supply of forecasts, their bandwidth, and their limited accuracy, it is unlikely that their prediction would be self-fulfilling; with forecasts by policy makers this may be different as has been suggested to have been the case for the Fed in 2008 (Stekler/Symington 2014) . Policy makers, however, would be required to fight the crisis and destroy the forecast (and a Lucas-rational private sector may or may not help). In any case, evidence for the influence of forecasts on macroeconomic behaviour is missing. More generally, while there is no evidence of asymmetrical loss functions among German forecasters overall (Döpke/Fritsche/Siliverstovs 2010), payoffs may differ in critical situations (Zarnowitz 1992: xvii) . 'Rocking the boat', being substantially different from the herd (e. g., CF), needs to be strongly advocated (IEO 2014: 19) and, if wrong, it may not only harm its exponents but also their institutions. In short, for forecasters it seems to pay to have 'low priors about the likelihood of a recession' (Fintzen/Stekler 1999) . The role of each of most of these explanations is difficult for outsiders to assess. If our collection of information is correct, these explanations may help to understand why forecasters failed to see the onset of the Great Recession. However, this should not mask that from a data perspective this could have been well the case.
Summary and conclusions
The onset of the Great Recession in Q2 2008 was not recognised until as late as November of that year, when the economy had been in recession for the past seven months. Forecasters did not issue warnings, though from July onward most data signalled that Germany might be in recession or else might enter one soon. The recession might have been a mild one, compared with the steep decline that started in Q4 2008. However, given the increasingly vulnerable situation of Germany and its major trading partners from 2007 onward -a typical 24 In interviews, forecasters usually disclaim such behaviour, though evidence is split (Döpke (2000) . 25 For a broad discussion of the concept of reflexive forecasts and the preconditions of selffulfilling or self-destroying forecasts, see Fulda 1994. constellation for negative shocks to be of particular influence -, deliberations on how policy makers should react to the situation could have started much earlier than in October 2008.
In this paper, we attempted to determine from a data perspective whether the start of the Great Recession in Germany could have been seen earlier.
We inspected real GDP forecasts for 2008 and 2009 by twelve major national and international institutions and their reactions to key real-time data, CLIs, and surveys from 2 April through 31 December 2008.
Listed here are the answers to the three questions raised at the beginning of this paper: 'Low priors about the likelihood of a recession' or preferring type II to type I errors is neither new nor exclusive to German forecasters. However, while the hesitation of US forecasters, for example, to predict a recession appears to be the consequence of several false alarms in the past, German forecasters examined here do not have this excuse, since they never predicted recessions that did not happen and hence could not issue false alarms. Examining US post-WWII recession forecasts, Fels/Hinshaw (1968: 122) summarised, 'As time goes by, analysts become increasingly aware of first the possibility, then the probability, and finally the certainty of a turning point'. In 2008, German forecasters cited the possibility of a recession only when the country was already more than seven months into it. Clearly, besides detailed analyses of recession forecasts, preferably by forecasters themselves, wider and more detailed evidence on the accuracy of intraannual and recession forecasting is needed -annual forecasts give an overly optimistic picture of forecasters' capacity to recognise crises in a timely fashion. Studies of recession forecasts should reveal whether forecasters' performance is dependent on its origin (we found that it is not), is internationally different, or has changed over time. Ironically, up to and including the Federal Republic of Germany's first recession 1966/67, when the growth trend was more than 4 % -but the memory of the Great Depression was still vivid -, forecasters were far more eager to warn of imminent growth slowdowns than thereafter (Berger 1997; Antholtz 2005) .
As to forecast revision, it is difficult to explain when and why forecasts are revised. It should be realised that forecasts are the result of a negotiation process, in which institutional interests as well as personal elements play an important role. 26 Lastly, if information processing is 'sticky' or data are 'noisy', then the gospel that 'more data' will improve forecasting accuracy as a general promise is not as convincing as often assumed by forecasters. How might forecasters' 'low priors about the probability of a recession' be changed? An initial idea would be to view these low priors as a symptom of a lack of competition in a profession characterised by a blend of profit-and nonprofit-oriented institutions and a mixture of monopolistic, oligopolistic, and competitive behaviour. However, the past half-century has seen a considerable increase and internationalisation of the forecast industry, though forecast accuracy has not improved; in particular, there is no evidence that profit-oriented institutions produce more accurate forecasts (Heilemann/Klinger 2006) . A major reason for this appears to be the low priors that 'recession' receives in the loss function of forecasters. However, forecast consumers too, in particular policy makers, tend to have low priors accepting that a crisis may be ahead. Recessions usually urge action -a request that is rarely warmly welcomed by politicians, the business community, or people in general. April: Positive signals came from production, sales in manufacturing, and orders in February and from the labour market in March and rising consumer prices and wholesale prices.
Negative: the Ifo-BCI continued to cool down remarkably. Negative signals emerged from declining orders in the construction industry, diminished retail sales and reduced import prices.
June: Positive signals, an increase in new orders in manufacturing, a rise in sales of manufacturing (April); exports had increased in April, as had in May increased employment and orders in the construction industry in May, amid rising consumer and producer prices.
Negative signals came from new orders in manufacturing and declining production in manufacturing in April as the Ifo-BCI cooled down considerably.
July: Positive signals included increased retail sales and imports in May and rising employment in June. Strong gains of GDP in the EU in Q1, drastically improved employment in the service sector during the same quarter, and robust increases in manufacturing, strong increase of consumer prices and producer prices, all caused by rising energy prices.
Negative signals were manufacturing and construction orders, a declining Ifo-BCI, falling wholesale sales, amid which the ECB raised interest rates (0.25 ppts.).
August: Positive signals came from exports, slightly increased industrial production in June, with its decline May revised slightly upwards. Employment and wholesale sales had increased a strong increase of consumer prices and of import prices.
Negative signals emerged from lower nominal retail sales, lower new orders in manufacturing, stagnant imports, increased wholesale prices, and shrinking GDP in Q2 (flash estimates: -0.2, now -0.5). Notably fewer construction outlays, a shrinking GDP in the euro area (by -0.2 percent) and in the EU (by -0.1), expansion of employment diminished in Q2, and lower new orders in construction in Q1 and Q2. The Ifo-BCI worsened. Agreed wages and salaries hardly exceeded the inflation rate, which also had slightly declined.
September: Among positive signals, sales increased in various service sectors in Q2, as did imports. Consumer prices rose in July, the public deficit dropped in Q1-Q2, employment slightly increased in August, whereas wholesale prices declined, employment in manufacturing rose, and new orders in industry and in construction improved in July.
Negative signals were exports and manufacturing sales decreased in Julyparticularly in the euro area -wholesale sales in real terms dropped in August, and producer and consumer prices sank. The Ifo-BC Index further deteriorated in September.
October: Positive signals include a considerable increase of new orders in industry in August, sinking import prices, increased wholesale and retail sales, and increased employment. The ECB also lowered interest rates (-0.5 ppts.).
Negative signals included a considerable drop of exports and imports in August, a further worsening of Ifo-BC Index in October, a slight increase in collectively agreed wage and salary incomes (real terms) and considerable drop in consumer prices.
November: Among positive signs were a slight increase in manufacturing employment, an increase in wholesale prices in October, stable producer prices in manufacturing, and a slight increase in new orders in September. The ZEW-FMI rose amid increased employment, exports and imports in September. The government decided upon measures to promote growth by 50 billion in 2009 and 2010.
Negative signs included a sharp decline of new orders in industry in September, which coincide that month with a steep fall in production in manufacturingprimarily in industry but also in construction -and manufacturing sales in September after an upward revised increase in August, a shrinking GDP in Q3 (flash estimate 0.5 %), a further worsening of the Ifo-BCI, a shrinking GDP in the euro area and in the EU by 0.2), a slowing down of employment expansion, shrinking wholesale sales and sharply falling of the inflation rate.
December: Positive signs include increasing exports and imports in October as well as in Q3 in general, increased employment, and lowered ECB interest rates (-0.75 %).
Negative signs included shrinking retail sales, a decreased GDP in the euro area zone and in the EU by 0.2 in Q3, shrinking sales in manufacturing in October, diminished production in manufacturing, industry, and construction. The Ifo-BCI worsened further in December, amid a sharp decline in new construction orders, a heavy fall of wholesale prices in November, amid a declining increase in consumer prices, and a strong decline in producer prices and in import prices.
Sources: See text and Overview 2*(See supplemental material in the online version of this article).
